


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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

Secret

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March 28, 1975
No. 0083/75

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Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600310001-2

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Soviets Disrupt Passover Services

The disruption by police of Passover services at Moscow synagogue on March 26 is seen by Jewish sources as a further warning that any activities even remotely connected with agitation for Jewish emigration will be dealt with severely.

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[redacted] the ugly behavior of the police in keeping Jews off sidewalks surrounding the synagogue contrasted sharply with the more moderate treatment in recent months of Jewish non-political, public activity. This was particularly true during the Simchas Torah services last October, when worshippers were allowed to dance in the streets. This week, the stern action of the police included several arrests on unknown charges.

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[redacted] forthcoming trial of two young Jews recently arrested after a short-lived, pro-emigration demonstration in front of Moscow's Lenin Library--and perhaps the future trials of those arrested at the synagogue--could signal the start of a broader campaign of intimidation designed to discourage vocal advocates of emigration, as well as emigration itself. Several Jewish activists reportedly have been warned by the KGB and police against further demonstrations, and some were threatened with conscription. A few of them have left Moscow for other areas of the country, feeling a bad situation in the capital is turning worse.

These developments suggest that the regime is intensifying its effort to discourage Jewish emigration by multiplying red tape, publicizing allegedly poor economic and social conditions in Israel and the West, and harassing selected activists.

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At the same time, gadflies whose cases have been widely publicized abroad, and whose pro-emigration organizational activities in the USSR are keeping the issue under the spotlight, are apparently being allowed to leave. The latest such case is that of Jewish geneticist Aleksandr Goldfarb, who has successfully goaded the authorities into granting him permission to emigrate to Israel.

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West German Foreign Minister Visits Prague

The Czechoslovak regime rolled out the red carpet for West German Foreign Minister Genscher's three-day visit to Prague this week.

In light of a recent hardening of the Czechoslovak propaganda line against Bonn, the warm reception reportedly left the West Germans pleasantly surprised. Czechoslovak media almost overnight replaced criticism with positive coverage of the visit. Party chief Husak and Premier Strougal were described as "remarkably friendly" to their German guests. Indeed, Foreign Minister Chnoupek told the Germans that the party Central Committee had decided to treat Genscher and his colleagues in a "constructive and positive way."

The West Germans reportedly were also well satisfied with substantive aspects of the visit. The greatest progress was in the field of industrial cooperation--an area that vitally interests Prague. Both sides decided to stand down on negotiations over a scientific-technical agreement, however, pending the resolution of the knotty Berlin clause issue by Bonn and Moscow.

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Pitfalls of 30th Anniversary Plans

Soviet plans for celebrating the 30th anniversary of the end of the "Great Fatherland War" reflect the interest of the leadership in achieving some flavor of Western participation, including that of the US. The effort to revive memories of the wartime alliance is, of course, a useful adjunct to Soviet detente policies, but it has some built-in perils. Two of these are how to deal with the war in the Pacific, and how to handle the role of allied air forces in Europe.

The focus of the "Great 30th" propaganda is on the war in Europe. Japan is cited as one of the powers defeated by the might of Soviet arms, but the conflict in the Pacific is almost completely ignored. For the Soviet domestic audience, this is the only practical approach, since the war against Germany was the whole war for the Soviet population and Soviet histories of the period blur over the very belated Soviet entry into the Pacific conflict. This narrow view of World War II will, however, be increasingly difficult to maintain for foreign audiences, as publicity increases in the build-up for May 9.

Even the war in the European theater presents some problems for the "hands-across-the-sea" effort. A recent article in *Krasnaya Zvezda* by two Soviet army colonels, for example, attempts to refute claims that the British and American bombing of Germany in World War II contributed significantly to the German defeat. The decisive factor, the authors emphasize, was the Soviet offensive from the east.

The article attacks the notion, allegedly being touted in the West, that the Anglo-American air strikes were the main means of destroying the German war production capability. The authors cite figures

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and quote the views of Western authorities to disprove this. They claim that initially only ship-building facilities and naval bases were targets of air attack, while factories producing tanks--of special concern to the Soviets--were subjected to no air strikes at all. They also claim that, instead of striking at key targets such as aircraft production facilities, the Western allies concentrated their bombing efforts on air bases and airports. Many targets in Germany, they assert, were exempt from attack because their preservation was of interest to Western monopoly interests. As a result, German production of planes, tanks, and artillery continued to increase as late as 1944.

The authors also deny that the program of air raids took the place of a second front. Such a claim they say, is mere rationalization by the Western allies to justify their failure to honor a promise to open a second front in 1942.

Indeed, the authors assert that Western air attacks did not even draw the Luftwaffe away from the Eastern front. The Germans retained only their air defense units in the West, assigning the main part of the Luftwaffe, including its strike force of attack bombers, to the East. Even in the air war, the article asserts, the crucial battles took place on the German-Soviet front, and it was here that the greatest Nazi air losses occurred.

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